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Introduction 
Marking its fiftieth anniversary, we revisit Aaron Cicourel’s Method and Measurement in 
Sociology (MM) (Cicourel 1964). In so doing we consider the book’s legacy and influence in 
the context of the continued and urgent significance of such properly methodological inquiry. 
We point out that MM anticipates a good many methodological issues at the heart of 
contemporary debates within the social sciences and suggest that many of the issues that 
concerned Cicourel, far from abating, have been exacerbated. Problems of method and 
measurement remain pressing, not least in social scientists’ responsibilities for the use and 
interpretation of data (cf. Savage and Burrows, 2007). In returning to key questions of 
methodological procedure, and of the accomplishment of ‘measurement’ in human affairs, we 
see that the frustrations of Cicourel and those who influenced him still prevail. Cicourel’s 
critique of sociological measurement of some fifty years ago has repercussions for social 
researchers – of qualitative, quantitative and mixed persuasions – today. A thoroughly 
sociological understanding of method and measurement – as a situated, contingent, 
contextual and ultimately and unavoidably practical accomplishment – has a critical 
contribution to make within social inquiry. We also note how such methodographical work 
(cf. Greiffenhagen et al, 2011) is central to realising sociology’s contribution and intervention 
as it bears on ubiquitous regimes of institutional performance measurement, league tables, 
risk assessments, audit, forms of digital ‘big data’ and indeed the whole machinery of social 
measurement driving a ubiquitous audit culture. Method and measurement, or rather the 
practices and principles of members making decisions as to what to measure and how, are 
powerful in producing the very contours of reality for the constitution of institutions, publics, 
and populations. We therefore commend a critical and empirical engagement with method 
and measurement as a means of addressing the ways in which measurement practices come to 
give ‘official imprint to reality’ (Goffman, 1983: 17). We begin with a review of the thrust of 
the critique presented in MM.    
 
The Principles of Measurement  
2 
 
Although it has rather disappeared from view in current methodological texts, at one time 
MM was one of the most cited methodological texts in sociology, and appeared on very many 
reading lists for courses in research methods. Like many an influential book, MM has 
probably been cited and invoked more frequently than it has actually been read. Classic 
works often have a sort of virtual existence, constructed through imperfect memories and the 
uncritical use of secondary sources. Re-reading nearly always recuperates original intentions 
that have been obscured by succeeding simplifications and distortions. This is certainly the 
case with MM. Here we outline some of the key principles and critiques of measurement 
strategies that underpin this important text and the subsequent discussions of specific 
methods it contains.  
 
A central issue tackled by Cicourel is that standard sociological procedures do not begin with, 
nor are grounded by, an adequate theory of (the relations of) action, meaning and 
interpretation. The practice of professional sociology lacks a sufficiently sophisticated 
understanding of its own mechanisms of causality that are the stock-in-trade for the majority 
of what Harold Garfinkel (2002), one of Cicourel’s teachers, would come to call formal 
analytic sociology. This, as Cicourel has it, routinely results in sociological measurements 
being made by fiat. In a good deal of sociological work, one finds the imposition of 
categories and the reification of indicators and variables on the basis of unexamined 
assumptions about the phenomenon in question, and about the status and accomplishment of 
documents of that phenomenon in the first instance. It may often be a matter of using 
whatever proxy measures are available to professional social science, rather than seeking to 
provide a thorough examination of the phenomenon in question, or – worse still perhaps – 
falling back on introspective subjective interpretations and individualised notions of meaning. 
Cicourel thus argued for an empirical attention to how the ‘working theories’ of researchers 
are operationalised in producing, handling and interpreting different forms of data. This work 
is itself grounded in and developed from analysts’ everyday interactional competencies as 
described in recent methodographical work (cf. Greiffenhagen et al, 2011; Housley and 
Smith, 2011). In MM, Cicourel thus develops a position, owing much to the lectures and 
writings of Alfred Schütz (e.g. 1953; 1954), which aims to address the very grounds from 
which empirical inquiries proceed. Social studies of social phenomena must, then, finds ways 
to adequately handle the production of their available phenomena in the first instance, thus 
preserving their properly social character. As Schütz (1954: 261) wrote: 
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All forms of naturalism and logical empiricism simply take for granted this social 
reality, which is the proper object of the social sciences. Intersubjectivity, 
interaction, intercommunication, and language are simply presupposed as the 
unclarified foundation of these theories. They assume, as it were, that the social 
scientist has already solved his fundamental problem, before scientific inquiry 
starts. 
 
This strongly phenomenological and proto-ethnomethodological (Lynch, 1991) approach of 
MM is often lost in secondary accounts and subsequent receptions. Indeed, a review of such 
texts might lead one to suspect that Cicourel’s original work consisted simultaneously of a 
radical critique of the quantitative research strategies that dominated sociology at the time, 
and a simple celebration of qualitative methods, championing qualitative research over 
positivist techniques, the sample survey and the use of official statistics, in particular. It 
should already be clear that the position developed in MM is not reducible to a naïve 
distinction or valuation of qualitative of quantitative strategies. Such gross simplifications 
obscures the book’s central methodological contribution. As Cicourel explained in an 
interview (Witzel and Mey, 2004: 30): 
Learning about mathematical statistics within mathematics is necessary in order 
to understand what possible alternatives might exist for creating measurement 
systems commensurate with the phenomena that are the focus of one's research. 
Let me underscore the fact that I am NOT opposed to quantification or 
formalization or modeling, but do not want to pursue quantitative methods that 
are not commensurate with the research phenomena addressed.  
 
So, in addition to insisting that methods and ‘measurement systems’ are commensurate with 
the phenomena under consideration (a claim routinely made in social research, but seldom 
examined), MM aims to establish measurement as an inescapably practical and situated 
activity, accomplished via various methods (‘ethno’ and ‘scientific’) and in various 
institutional contexts1. Measurement is positioned as a decision-making process 
accomplished within these contexts and disciplinary and institutional frames. Cicourel 
identifies an exercise on coding data for his study of juvenile justice as a key exemplar in the 
development of his thinking in this vein.  As Garfinkel (1967) later noted and had observed in 
                                                
1	  There	  are,	  of	  course,	  mundane	  measurement	  practices	  too	  –	  see	  Crabtree	  et	  al	  (2013)	  .	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coders’ practices in the suicide prevention centre (1997[1967]), often this process remains 
‘up for grabs’ until the production of the final version, after which the various prior stages, 
trials and mistakes, best estimates and bad decisions are submerged and smoothed in a post-
hoc account. More specifically, the dual nature of measurement – conceptual or theoretical 
frames on the one hand, and practical activities on the other – is seldom made explicit in 
either sociological inquiries or other institutional work. Cicourel’s own attention to such 
matters was informed by issues of coding in the context of his study of juvenile Justice 
(Cicourel, 1968). 
 
Cicourel’s central concern and critique developed in MM is thus double-edged. As 
demonstrated in his other studies in that period (Cicourel, 1963; 1968 1974), measurement is 
a process of decision-making, practically realised, embedded in the social conditions, 
situations and structures in which it is accomplished. This is often lost in contemporary 
treatments of ‘method’ as simply a neutral tool for getting a job done (that job being the 
straightforward measure of social reality for professional purposes). There is thus a continued 
significance for a properly sociological rendering of measurement for the practice of the 
social sciences themselves and for the contribution of sociology in analysing and critiquing 
measurement practices in society. Whatever the institutional context, understanding 
measurement as an unavoidably practical and situated activity opens it up as a topic of 
sociological, ethnographic and ethnomethodological inquiry. MM is a call for sociology to 
pursue a programme of research that levers open the black box of measurement. The practical 
grounds of powerful and seemingly immutable social facts are displayed. 
 
Questions of Method 
Understood within this wider project, MM is far from an uncritical endorsement of 
some research strategies above others. Cicourel is engaged in a thorough evaluation of 
the foundations of sociological knowledge. We describe here the ways in which the 
underlying principles of MM, outlined above, pervade the discussion of specific 
methods.  
 
Notwithstanding retrospective views of MM, it is clear that Cicourel was in no sense 
celebrating ‘qualitative’ research strategies in contradistinction to surveys and the like. His 
comments on field research and interviewing are just as pointed as his critique of other 
statistical and purely numeric approaches. Cicourel has a good deal to say about the conduct 
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of field research (by participant observation) and face-to-face interviewing. In rereading MM, 
it needs to be remembered that – in common with many of the methods Cicourel discusses – 
there was a relatively restricted corpus of qualitative methodological literature for Cicourel to 
draw on. By the early 1960s there were few discussions of field research, or ethnographic 
research as it might more usually be called today. Equally, there was nothing like the 
literature reflecting on the nature and conduct of the social-science interview. Like the rest of 
the book, the relevant chapters focus on how everyday knowledge and background 
assumptions enter into the practical conduct of sociological research. What is perfectly clear 
is that Cicourel is no advocate of field research as a simple alternative to quantitative or more 
systematic procedures. Indeed, his comments on field research suggest quite severe strictures 
on its conventional conduct. In discussing field work and its conduct, Cicourel admits that he 
is proposing unrealisable ideals, and that he sets up something of a straw-man argument. He 
notes that there was an emergent and growing literature on key aspects of field research (such 
as processes of access or establishing field roles), but suggests that field researchers proceed 
without explicit theoretical explication of how they interpret observed social action, or indeed 
how that action is made available for interpretation. They therefore have but a shaky 
scientific warrant for their analyses. This is the (now) familiar, albeit not fully or even widely 
acknowledged, critique of the common-sense foundation of much sociological analysis, 
whether based on fieldwork or otherwise, in which ‘they simply put some category in. They 
make sense to us in doing that, but they’re doing it simply as another Member’ (Sacks, 1995: 
41-2). In other words, sociological analysis deals with and relies upon the same reasoning and 
language practices as any other activity done by people in society. This fact remains 
unacknowledged in approaches which treat the availability of common language as a resource 
for, rather than topic of, inquiry.        
 When he turns to the practicalities of interviewing, we find a similar perspective. 
Cicourel uses a small number of methodological texts on the sociological interview in order 
to raise some fundamental issues that have subsequently been widely rehearsed. As is the 
case throughout MM, the emphasis is on the researcher’s unacknowledged and unexamined 
reliance on everyday or common-sense knowledge. The interview is a social, communicative 
encounter, and the interviewer must make on-the-spot interpretations in constructing the 
conversation, relying on the competence of ordinary conversational methods. In Cicourel’s 
own words,  
This discussion of interviewing as both method and object of social study from 
the theoretical orientation of this book will attempt to show how common-sense 
6 
 
knowledge and everyday language and meaning enter into the role-taking process 
of the interview; how common-sense interpretations must be used as technical 
knowledge by the interviewer for deciding how the information obtained from the 
respondent is to be interpreted. (p. 76) 
One might also add that, of course, the respondent is equally engaged in acts of interpretation 
in order to generate appropriate responses. Even a cursory survey of the ‘most read’ lists of 
leading methodologically focused journals demonstrate how this issue is still being grappled 
with; a survey of journals that comprise in the main of interview based ‘qualitative research’ 
will demonstrate that how researchers and respondents, together, ‘do data’ (Hester and 
Francis, 1994) deserves continued attention. 
 
Just what was it that Cicourel had to say about survey research and the data derived from 
questionnaires? Although the chapter on questionnaires is quite short, it provides the most 
characteristic of his sociological critiques, and because it is memorable it is – as already 
suggested – associated with the radical critique of statistics. In some quarters, this is the 
enduring memory of MM. At the heart of the discussion is the repeated assertion that the 
conduct of questionnaire-based research draws upon common-sense assumptions about 
language and knowledge in order to construct equivalences between individual 
predispositions, such as ‘attitudes’ and ‘beliefs’, and standardised indicators (questionnaire 
items). Equally, Cicourel suggests that topics conventionally regarded as standard ‘face-
sheet’ data (age, sex, occupation) warrant a more culturally and socially sensitive treatment. 
The translation of ‘variables’ into two or more categories also seems to be arbitrary in many 
cases in light of the social phenomena that they purport to measure. The issues underlying 
these and other topics in MM are not simple matters of methodological preference. Indeed, 
the very notion that one method might be a priori ‘better’ than another is challenged by MM. 
Cicourel was not simply reacting against dominant ways of doing professional sociology at 
the time that MM was written. His critiques do not result in a simple set of methodological 
precepts or priorities.  
 
As we have already seen, Cicourel’s comments on measurement are by no means based on a 
crude assertion that social life is not ‘measurable’ in general, or that it does not lend itself 
more narrowly to quantitative forms of representation. We need to appreciate his wider 
perspective. And in this broader sense, we find MM alluding to the sociology of knowledge 
in which the methods of sociological research are themselves topi
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knowledge, as well as being resources in studying knowledge. To emphasise this point, there 
is nothing in MM that explicitly constitutes a critique of quantification per se. ‘Measurement’ 
here means something a good deal more profound than the casual, or lazy, equation of 
measurement with quantification. Cicourel’s book is anything but lazy, and he addresses the 
issues primarily as topics in the sociology of knowledge. We can get a sense of the power of 
his critique of the sample survey. The survey was widely regarded as the method of choice 
for sociologists – especially in the United States - and any fundamental critique of it was 
readily seen as a radical assault on the foundations of disciplinary knowledge. Indeed, the 
import of Cicourel’s commentary was as radical in its reception as the so-called crisis of 
representation (Marcus and Fischer, 1986) that afflicted cultural anthropology two decades 
later. Both critiques addressed the taken-for-granted bases of legitimacy of the disciplines. 
 
Measurement, social science and the sociology of knowledge 
In a way that is entirely characteristic of the period and its intellectual style, MM is informed 
by a stated desire to promote ‘scientifically’ adequate sociological knowledge. In particular, 
he explores how the contents of sociological knowledge are permeated by the language and 
knowledge of everyday life: ‘The confounding of sociological language about sociological 
theories, social events, and the language used by subjects under study is a basic problem in 
field research and other research methods such as content analysis and laboratory 
experiments’ (p. 2). The common language problem should also be considered in relation to 
sociological measurement which repeats or reflects the institutional or bureaucratic processes 
which produce data taken ‘as given’ by social scientists. In other words, the overall critique is 
an early version of the ethnomethodological programme, addressing the recurrent 
topic/resource distinction in relation to communicative practice and (the progressive 
flattening of) the relation between scientific and everyday knowledge. The problem, then and 
now, faced by the social scientist is the ‘no time out’ fact that they, irrevocably and 
unavoidably, operate within the same linguistic frames as that which constitute and categorise 
the object of study, the realities and organizational features of the phenomenon being 
analysed, measured and described. Cicourel draws on Schütz (see, in particular, pp. 60-1) to 
see how the ‘professional’ categories employed by the social scientist are forever predicated 
by, grounded in, and indistinguishable from the very same categories and mundane reasoning 
practices (Pollner, 1987) employed by members in the course of socially organised activity. It 
is in this sense that any form of measurement is seen as both problematic and as topic of 
inquiry (and see Lynch, 1991). What is needed, Cicourel asserts at the very outset, is a theory 
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of instrumentation and a theory of data, so that the observer’s priorities, theories and 
interpretative work can be disentangled, or at least distinctly acknowledged, from the 
materials and artefacts that are available as that observer’s ‘data’. 
 
In evaluating the grounds of the construction of sociological knowledge, it is noticeable how 
often Cicourel invokes the yard-stick of ‘science’. Here the transformation in sociology itself 
might be instructive. When MM was published, sociological studies of scientific knowledge 
were few and far between, and there was little in the mainstream of American sociology. If 
we now were to apply Cicourel’s method – of treating sociological research as a topic in the 
sociology of knowledge itself - then we would have a much greater wealth of sources on the 
sociology of science on which to draw (e.g. Collins, 1992; Lynch et al, 1983; Merton, 1973; 
Latour, 1987). In doing so, we might be willing to suspend cherished assumptions concerning 
‘science’ itself. We would be forced to recognise that there is no scientific knowledge – 
‘natural’ or otherwise – that is not itself informed by everyday practices, local judgments and 
acts of classification. We might be forced to acknowledge in turn that the objects of science 
are as thoroughly constructed as the objects of sociological knowledge. A twenty-first-
century version of MM would have to acknowledge that the benchmark of ‘science’ is itself a 
rhetorical construction, while appeals to science themselves often rest on questionable 
assumptions about what constitutes valid knowledge (not to mention debates relating to the 
(im)possibility of demonstrating causality in social studies (Winch, 1958)). In that sense, MM 
may now seem crude in its invocations of science. Scientific and social-scientific knowledge 
would now be subjected to critical scrutiny in a symmetrical manner, while science would not 
be invoked as a gold standard. It does, however, remain apt in it strictures on particular 
sociological techniques.  
 
The sociology of measurement  
Sensitivity to measurement – coding decisions especially – has become especially pressing 
with the rise of ‘audit culture’ in and across many contexts. The assessment of performance, 
the compilation of league tables, and the punishment of under-performance have meant that 
measurement has achieved an ever-more significant role in the political economy of welfare, 
education, administration and business. The use of management information, much of it 
based on the routine collection of statistics, is dependent on the development, production and 
interpretation of standardised measures, often collected repeatedly at regular intervals and 
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used to track relative, institutionally defined, success and failure. They are often used to make 
direct comparisons between agencies and organisations at all societal levels – from nation-
states down to individual schools, hospitals or welfare agencies. Individuals and 
organisations are also measured against ‘key performance indicators’, serving similar 
functions, comparing standardised outcomes against predetermined criteria of success often 
produced from generic principles from at (at least) one step remove from the practice they are 
intended to assess. 
 
It is abundantly clear that the statistics themselves (as opposed to the political decisions based 
on them) are contentious. The idea that there is a ‘story behind the stats’ is commonplace, the 
awareness that this might include their very practical production far less so. Crude 
comparisons and interpretations are often placed on numerical data that are in turn based 
upon a host of assumptions and measurements that are predicated on classifications and 
codings that are in turn reliant upon human judgment and the actual business of producing an 
maintaining material records; statistics and their uses are pervaded by practical and technical 
issues of data and their interpretation. The contentiousness of their use does not lie simply in 
the political and administrative decisions based on them. Decisions involved in the 
accomplishment of the measurement practices are just as political as the decisions made with 
those measurements.  
 
Of course, it is not only statistical and quantitative approaches that are found in within wider 
social and institutional contexts. The interview is also an increasingly pervasive form of 
assessing and measuring. Aligned with the reification of the individual within social sciences 
and a Romantic understanding of the self and subjectivity, interviews are regularly employed 
to ‘discover’ what someone really thinks or feels (Atkinson and Silverman, 1997; Baker, 
2002). These assertions and applications of the interview are as problematic as the 
unquestioning use of statistics as reflecting social reality. In a way similar to, but going 
beyond, the production and interpretation of statistics, the conduct of the interview is 
thoroughly context-dependent. That context includes local cultural knowledge that informs 
the interviewer and the respondent, the setting of the interview, and the ethnomethods 
available to the participants in producing the interaction as an interview. We have had a great 
deal of methodological commentary on the interview, and the observation that it is a situated 
encounter, in which the exchange of talk is locally produced, no longer sounds quite as 
radical as it might have done at one time. But when Cicourel first published his 
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methodographic studies, he seemed to be striking at foundations. Nevertheless, the extended 
interview is a taken-for-granted mode of social inquiry that is far too frequently used in an 
uncritical, unreflective way and with insufficient regard for its actual accomplishment as a 
social encounter.   
 
Cicourel pursued these concerns in further empirical and methodographical work. In Theory 
and Method in a Study of Argentine Fertility, Cicourel (1974) examines the role of theory and 
method for and within a study of fertility and reproductive behaviour. Although there are 
introductory chapters by way of background, and some descriptive ‘ethnographic’ writing on 
the social setting, the main contribution lies in the discussion of the accomplishment of 
interviews as employed in the study. Cicourel devotes himself to an extended consideration 
of how the interviews conducted with Argentinian couples were actually enacted and how 
they unfolded through and in relation to the interviewer’s in situ interpretations and 
questioning strategies. As is more readily recognised now, the import of questions and 
answers reflect what has gone before in the course of the interview and thus significance, 
meaning and intent develop in stepwise, sequential, fashion. As we would expect, given 
Cicourel’s methodological interests, he focuses on the interpretative procedures whereby 
series of spoken exchanges might be condensed into standard (‘appropriate’) responses. 
Cicourel also includes a discussion of the problems of coding responses to open-ended 
questions. In has become a familiar style, he uses a number of concrete examples from the 
study to display how a coder might need to invoke general cultural knowledge as well as 
familiarity with the unfolding interview itself in order to make ‘reasonable’ inferences about 
the respondent’s intentions, thus raising the issue of ecological validity in a manner that is 
available for empirical inspection. The standardised ‘variables’ that might be also understood 
as antecedents or determinants of fertility are thus shown to be the product of interpretative 
work. In his work on educational decision-making (with Kitsuse, 1963), Cicourel had dealt 
with the pervasive practices of educational measurement and the assessment of educational 
ability. The high-school ethnography demonstrates how ad hoc judgments of aptitude had 
real and lasting (and hence self-fulfilling) effects on the students and their educational 
careers. In the same vein, the monograph on juvenile justice (Cicourel, 1968) documents the 
practical, interpretative work that goes into the construction of types, categories and 
outcomes. Hence the statistical rates of educational attainment and of juvenile offending are 
shown to be based on processes of interpretation and inference that inscribe ad hoc 
judgements. Processes of classification (the ‘social construction’ of categories) are 
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mechanisms of measurement. Studies of diagnostic inference in medicine are therefore key 
aspects of a generic sociology of measurement. Bowker and Starr’s (2000) analysis of 
diagnostic categories, such as those enshrined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual is a 
major contribution to the sociology of measurement in its own right and is in direct line of 
descent from Cicourel.  
 
Contemporary contestations of measurement practices  
The United Kingdom has witnessed many examples in recent years, but the most recent 
controversy in health care illustrates the point. A unit performing cardiac surgery for children 
was closed following the publication of numerical data purporting to show unacceptably high 
death-rates. This followed an investigation into an English hospital trust that also showed 
highly standardised mortality rates. Both were treated as scandals in the mass media, 
accompanied by reports of numerous ‘excess’ deaths as a result of poor care or failed surgery. 
Now it is clear that there is no simple enumeration possible of ‘mortality’. Rates of death in 
hospital have to be standardised in terms of the demographic characteristics of patients and 
the attendant risks, the severity of the conditions treated, the nature of surgery and other 
treatments, and so on. The methods used to achieve such standardisation are themselves open 
to dispute. But before such statistical work can be done, medical conditions, treatments and 
outcomes all have to be enumerated. Therefore they all have to be coded. There are 
international classifications of diagnostic and treatment categories which remain inextricably 
dependent on the judgment of coders, working with data that are themselves, in the first 
instance, dependent on medical practitioners’ judgments. Measured outcomes – in terms of 
standardised mortality rates – depend on how medical staff list conditions and complications, 
and on discharge practices (e.g. to hospices for terminally ill patients). In other words, 
apparently simple decisions – the support or closure of clinical services – depend entirely on 
chains of local practices, professional judgments, classificatory decisions, and coding 
accuracy. These chains of interpretive practice are then transformed into statistics that are 
frequently reported and acted upon with little explicit acknowledgement by policy-makers 
and politicians of sampling issues, distributions, significance levels, outliers, standard errors; 
indeed the entire spectrum of statistical inference is often elided from the decision-making 
process.           
 To take an example from another institutional domain, league tables have become a 
common and taken-for-granted feature of contemporary public life. Like hospitals, schools 
colleges and universities are all ranked according to a variety of measures. All such league 
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tables have a number of features that deserve critical attention. First, there is a presentational 
issue: league tables often exaggerate difference. Once ratio-level measurements are turned 
into a single ordinal-level ranking, then tiny differences in absolute scores can be turned into 
what look like major differences in performance and reputation. Moreover, the choice of 
indicators often seems to be based on the numerical data available rather than a principled 
assessment of what data ought to be gathered. Then again, the combination of a series of 
indicators into a single scale is dubious at best. It is far from clear that student-staff ratios, the 
number of international staff and the number of citations to publications (for example) can 
really be combined into a single score of excellence. It is even less clear that the number of 
first and upper-second-class degrees awarded is a single measure of anything: in some 
contexts it may reflect the excellence of the student-intake, in others the excellence of the 
teaching, and in yet others the very low standards applied by examiners! It is clear that even 
on the basis of the data available, a multi-dimensional analysis would be more faithful. But of 
course that would undermine the league-table ordering that is the desired effect.  
 
It is abundantly clear that we have a continuing and urgent need for programmes of research 
on the social production, presentation and interpretation of a vast range of measurement in 
public life. Research programmes such as Evelyn Ruppert’s multi-site investigation of 
European statistics is one key exemplar of the kind of research that is needed across a wide 
range of agencies and kinds of data. It also exemplifies how social scientists need to 
synthesise quantitative and qualitative research expertise. Indeed, we need rigorous 
qualitative studies of a wide range of emergent measurements and experimental methods. We 
especially need careful examinations of those procedures that are widely regarded as the 
gold-standard benchmarks of methodological procedure. For instance, as Berg and 
Timmermans (2010) have demonstrated, close sociological investigation reveals that ‘gold 
standard’ methods rest on shaky foundations. Ethnographic studies of RCTs in medical 
research suggest that their status can be open to question. Clinicians’ equipoise between 
different treatments can be difficult to sustain. The enrolment of patients into clinical trials 
rests on chains of diagnostic inferences that are extrinsic to the research design itself (e.g. the 
staging of a tumour), and may be susceptible to normal (Type I or Type II) error. This is far 
more than a matter of critique, and it goes beyond improving the validity of statistics and 
classifications. A sociology of measurement – conceived as a branch of the sociology of 
knowledge – is one goal. It thus has close affinities with the sociology of scientific 
knowledge. As we have already suggested, the two are inextricably linked.  
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Conclusion  
In revisiting the classic Method and Measurement, and outlining its legacy and influence, we 
aimed to achieve something worthwhile in celebrating this book per se and in pointing to the 
continued significance of approaching measurement as a practical decision-making activity. 
As we noted, this contribution is double-edged. Cicourel’s strictures on sociological research 
that is not attentive to its own sociology of knowledge remain valuable. They provide 
valuable correctives to a variety of extreme positions, not least –as we have suggested – 
various forms of ‘interpretative’ and ‘qualitative’ research that lack theoretical and 
methodological rigour. They also provide correctives to ill-conceived forms of measurement, 
in which inappropriate or unduly crude categories are imposed more or less arbitrarily, 
without due regard for the forms and contents of socially organized everyday life and 
knowledge. There is, thus, significance for the sociological questioning and examination of 
the practices of social science, not for purpose of gleefully tedious introspection, but as a 
means of keeping a rigorous sociological imagination alive and relevant2.    
 MM also endorses an empirical programme in the sociology of knowledge and 
measurement informed by the systematic study of the sociology of categorisation practices. 
In this sense, we aimed to demonstrate that MM can serve as a continued source of 
instruction and inspiration for sociologists aiming to examine the ways in which 
measurement gets done in a range of other professional and institutional fields and settings. 
As we have briefly outlined above, measurement is becoming increasingly central to the 
constitution of contemporary subjectivities, identities and experiences; there is much work for 
sociologists –and ethnographers and ethnomethodologists in particular – to do in relation to 
the ways in which populations, publics and selves are made up in and through increasingly 
pervasive measurement strategies. From decisions made in local educational settings to 
global economics, measurement is a constituent feature of the ways in which the present and 
future are configured yet remains an unavoidably practical and situated activity. Such areas of 
inquiry are, we trust, interesting enough sui generis; as fields of human activity, just like any 
other. We suggest, moreover, that sociology has a particular warrant for the description of the 
practices in and through which the official contours of social reality are shaped and a 
responsibility to ensure its own means and modes of inquiry are fit for this purpose. A 
warrant and responsibility for which MM can still be foundational.   
                                                
2	  See	  http://sociologicalimagination.org/archives/16120	  for	  Howard	  Becker,	  interviewed	  by	  Les	  Back,	  speaking	  on	  this	  and	  other	  topics.	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